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How and Why Do Lawyers Misbehave? 
Lawyers, Discipline, and Collegial Control 
Lynn Mather 
A fundamental principle of professional labor is that the members of a special­
ized occupation, as professionals, enjoy autonomy. In sociologist Elliot Freidson's 
words, professionals "control their own work."1 The practitioners themselves decide 
what constitutes acceptable or appropriate behavior. Professions establish rules and 
systems of self-regulation to teach and enforce the expected standards of conduct 
on their members. One way, then, to assess legal professionalism is to ask how well 
lawyers regulate themselves. The extensive literature on lawyer regulation paints a 
negative picture. 
The Watergate scandal of the early 1970s brought renewed scrutiny to the legal 
profession. Although a variety of changes have occurred since then to improve law­
yer regulation, numerous problems remain. Law schools now require students to 
take legal ethics, but such courses generally lack stature and respect. Bar discipline 
was reorganized in the 1970s to transfer some control from bar associations to agen­
cies of state supreme courts.2 State discipline agencies in turn have increased their 
investigation of grievances filed against lawyers. But the vast majority of grievances 
continue to be dismissed. Much professional discipline is private (such as a warn­
ing letter, reprimand, or confidential diversion program), which undermines public 
trust and confidence in the system.3 Further, even the most common forms of pub­
lic sanctions on lawyers (public censure, suspension, or disbarment) are specific to 
I appreciate the feedback on an earlier draft from faculty and students in Justice Studies, University of New 
Hampshire; Justice, Law, and Society, George Mason University; and Legal Studies, Brown University. 
Special thanks to Rick Abel, Scott Barclay, Ellen Butterfield, Ross Cheit, Ellen Cohn, Scott Cummings, 
Leslie Levin, Mark Suchman, Eli Wald, and Jim Wooten for their helpful comments. I am grateful to 
David Chambers for data and analysis of ethical conduct from surveys of Michigan law graduates. 
1 ELIOT F'REIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: ThEORY, PROPHECY AND POLICY 173 ( 1994). 
2 Michael J. Powell, Professional Divestiture: The Cession of Responsibility for Lawyer Discipline, 1986 
ABF REs. J. 31 (1986). 
3 Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 CEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2007). 
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that state, and nothing prevents a sanctioned attorney from seeking bar admission in 
another state (although they would be required to disclose any prior sanctions). 
Suits for legal malpractice have multiplied and now provide a significant par­
allel source of regulation over lawyers.4 Indeed, some attorneys specialize in pro­
fessional liability law, unlike P,ecades ago when very few lawyers were willing to 
represent a client in a suit against a professional colleague. Yet it is still difficult 
to win a legal malpractice suit, and some lawyers who lack insurance say they 
avoid it out of a belief that it will reduce their chances of being sued. 5 A grow­
ing number of jurisdictions are requiripg lawyers to disclose whether they carry 
malpractice insurance, and the proportion of lawyers with such insurance varies 
considerably by practice area and by state.6 Only Oregon mandates it for lawyers. 
Insurance companies have increasingly become important regulatory actors for 
the legal profession . 
Other sources of lawyer regulation have also emerged in recent years, such as 
criminal prosecution for egregious lawyer misconduct, more aggressive judicial 
oversight over lawyers for rude, careless, or otherwise unprofessional conduct, and 
requirements imposed on lawyers who interact with certain administrative agencies 
(such as securities lawyers aod the SEC). In short, .multiple overlapping regula­
tory systems operate to monitor attorney conduct. Some of these alternatives (or 
additions) to bar discipline have emerged because of public hostility toward lawyers 
and a lack of evidence that the legal profession is able to regulate itself. 
Despite the expansion of these regulatory structures, we still lack answers to basic 
empirical questions about lawyer behavior. How much lawyer misconduct is there? 
And are there any general patterns to it? Analysis of the data from state disciplin­
ary board actions and legal malpractice claims provides one way to evaluate legal 
professionalism, by focusing on lawyer deviance. In this chapter, I explore the eth­
ical violations lawyers commit, with the aim of increasing our understanding of 
the legal profession and its capacity to regulate itself. Besides considering formal 
sanctions resulting from bar grievances and legal malpractice claims, I examine 
informal sources of regulation and discipline for lawyers, including socialization, 
networks, and social norms that exist in different areas of legal practice. I conclude 
with two examples of how formal and informal discipline work together to produce 
and enforce norms of professionalism in practice. 
4 	 See, e.g., Manual Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REv. 
1657, 1661 ( 1  994) (noting that, from 1970 to 1989, the number of lawyers sued for legal malpractice 
increased more than five times). 
s LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 1 34 (2nd ed. 
2008). 
6 Estimates oflawyers who carry malpractice insurance range from 65 to 90%, according to recent state 
bar surveys. I d. 
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PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DEVIANCE 
Assessing the extent of attorney misconduct is challenging both as a matter of defini­
tion and data. The lack of a universal definition for professional lawyer conduct that 
applies across the entire legal profession creates a conceptual problem for any analy­
sis of attorney misconduct. The ethical rules adopted by each state, typically based 
on the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ostensibly define behavioral 
standards for all lawyers. But the rules only set bare minimums.7 And, as numer­
ous critics have argued, the rules are also indeterminate, vague, contradictory, and 
ignore the factual differences lawyers face across diverse legal work settings.8 
At the same time, the secrecy of state bar disciplinary processes and the fact that 
malpractice cases are usually resolved through insurance settlements, not pub­
lic trials, limit the availability of empirical data on this question. Even evidence of 
increased complaints to the bar or lawsuits filed against lawyers does not necessarily 
mean greater deviance because the increase could simply reflect more publicized 
regulation and/or general antilawyer sentiment in popular culture. Moreover, dis­
cipline numbers paint an incomplete picture of deviance because individuals are 
more likely to go to the bar with their grievances, whereas corporate clients might use 
market mechanisms to complain about attorney service - for example, seeking a fee 
reduction or simply taking their law work to another firm. And within a large law firm, 
unprofessional conduct is likely to be handled internally to avoid embarrassment to 
the firm. Thus, although bar discipline falls most heavily on solo practitioners and 
small firm lawyers, and proportionately less on large firm lawyers, "one cannot judge 
the prevalence of misconduct from the imposition of lawyer discipline."9 
7 	 See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 665, 731 ( 1994) 
(criticizing the bar's insistence on uniform ethical rules that produce "higher levels of abstraction and 
lower common denominators in regulatory standards than is desirable for ethical guidance"); see also ,
Richard L. Abel, Why Does the American Bar Association Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 ThXAs L. REv. 
639 ( 1  98 1)  . 
8 	 See, e.g., David Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468 ( 1  990); see also PAUL G. 
HAS KELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE As THE Y Do ( 1998). As an example of ambiguity in the Model Rules. 
compare two rules on the lawyer/client relationship. Rule 1 .2 (a) requires a lawyer to "abide by a client's 
decisions," but Rule 2 . 1  says to "exercise independent judgment and render candid advice." Taken 
together, the Rules thus allow lawyers to act as a "hired gun" or to follow a more independent model of 
representation, according to their own ideology oflegal practice and client expectations. The meaning 
of "professional" representation in the attorney-client relationship has become a matter for academic 
debate in theory and attorneys' discretion in practice. See Lynn Mather, Fundamentals: What Do 
Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do? 52 EMORY L. J. 1065 (2003); see also Abel, supra note 7. 
9 	 Lisa Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money, and 
Professional Integrity, 30 HoFSTRA L. REv. 879, 9 1 3  (2002); see also Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical 
World of Solo and Small Law Firm Practitioners, 41 Hous. L. REv. 309 (2004); State Bar of Californiƒ, 
Investigation and Prosecution of Disciplinary Complaints Against Attorneys in Solo Practice, Small 
Size Law Firms and Large Size Law Firms (200 1). 
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Lawyer Deviance: Case Studies from New York 
Richard Abel's recent book, Lawyers in the Dock, provides an important new analy­
sis of lawyers' professional conduct by asking, "how and why lawyers misbehave."10 
Through detailed investigation of the disciplinary proceedings against seven New 
York lawyers, Abel examines the personality, background, family, and work pressures 
that led these men (all his cases were male) to betray their clients or engage in other 
professional misconduct and, ultimately, to be sanctioned by the New York bar. 
Abel acknowledges that his cases were not randomly selected; indeed, after reading 
more than 200 discipline files, he selected "extreme" cases that were "arguably more 
revealing."11 The vivid portraits of these seven attorneys do show clearly how easily 
they made mistakes, large and small - often for what they believed to be good rea­
sons. Nevertheless, even such rich, detailed cases cannot show the full extent and 
general characteristics of lawyer misconduct. 
Abel describes the lawyers' deviance as their "betrayal of trust," yet the book 
never explicitly defines this fundamental notion, creating what Eli Wald describes 
in his book review as "a conceptual confusion" throughout the study.l2 This con­
fusion is not surprising considering that it parallels the difficulty of defining pro­
fessionalism in such a way as to clearly delineate the conduct expected from all 
lawyers, regardless of the type of legal work that they do, the cases they handle, or 
the clients they represent. Most of Abel's narrative and the lengthy cases themselves 
suggest that the "trust" these attorneys betrayed was their loyalty to clients. Abel has 
since explained that he meant "trust" to incorporate a broader meaning, includ­
ing "attorney loyalty to other constituencies such as courts, opposing counsel, the 
legal system, and the public." 1 3  Finding the appropriate balance of loyalty to these 
different (and potentially conflicting) constituencies creates an uncertain range of 
ethical conduct. 
Following the individualistic focus of the book's research, Abel concludes that 
"character is destiny," 14 and one must only "look for greed or need (which often are 
indistinguishable )"15 to explain what led the disciplined lawyers into such deep trou­
ble. Deviance among attorneys is no different from deviance in other occupations, 
he suggests. It reflects some combination of a person's psychological makeup and 
10 	 RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DocK: LEARNING FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
53 (2008). 
11 Id. at 57. 
12 Eli Wald, Book Review, 59 J. LEGAL Eouc. 3 1 1 ,  3 3 1  (2009) (reviewing ABEL, supra note 10). 
13 Id. at 3 34-3 35 .  Abel gave his more expansive definition in a recorded interview at the Baldy Center 
for Law & Social Policy, see id. at 3 34, and in a published response to other reviews, Richard L. Abel, 
Author Response, 1 1  LEGAL ETHICS 126 (2008), 
14 ABEL, supra note 10, at 496. 
15 Id. at 492. 
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upbringing, severe stress or  crisis, or  other economic, family, and social pressures, 
often combined with substance abuse and depression. 
Abel also looks beyond the individual stories to assess the social controls that exist 
to discipline lawyers in various work settings, and he is especially harsh on attorneys 
in solo practice. The book cites critics of the bar's disproportionate investigation of 
solo and small firm practitioners and notes that the harms of misconduct by large 
firm attorneys may in fact be more serious and "cost many more people much more 
money." 16 Yet, Wald argues that "by only selecting solo and small firm practitioners" 
for their deviance "the whole book sends an implicit message that this is where eth­
ical lapses occur." 17 Even more than that, the book sends that message explicitly in 
its conclusion. Abel writes, "it is not clear that any lawyer should" practice al9ne 
today, given the difficulty of making appearances in court while also being in the 
office, the ease of missing deadlines without a calendar system in place, and the 
lack of financial incentive that a partner might provide to maintain a reputation. 18 
Yet each of these arguments could apply to attorneys working in firms, both small 
and large: Multiple demands on lawyers prevent them from meeting court obliga­
tions; calendar systems are only as good as the people who create and employ them; 
partners who take advantage of their clients might also be willing to cheat on a 
partner. 19 
Instead of focusing solely on the personal history and details of individual lawyers, 
or on the difference in lawyers' professionalism according to firm size, I suggest we 
look more closely at the structure and culture of legal practice to see if there are pat­
terns in lawyers' misconduct. In particular, I focus on the context in which lawyers 
work - that is, the work conditions, clients, law and legal institutions, and social 
networks commonly found in specific areas of law practice. 
Lawyer Deviance and Collegial Control 
Consider the wide variation in the perceived "ethical conduct" of lawyers across for­
ty-two areas of practice in Cook County, Illinois, as reported in a well-known 1995 
survey by John Heinz, Robert Nelson, Rebecca Sandefur, and Edward Laumann.20 
16 Id. at 54-5 5 .  

1 7  Wald, supra note 12, a t  322. 

18 ABEL,supra note 10, at 525. 
19 	 See Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Ptiychology and 
from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1549, 1589 (2009); see also Lerman, supra 
note 9, at 910 (commenting that although law partners might be deterred from taking firm funds 
through loyalty, "the glue of partner loyalty may be weaker than it used to be"). 
20 JoHN P. HEINZ, RoBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD 0. LAuMANN, URBAN 
LAWYERS: ThE NEw SociAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005). The survey asked professors and legal 
researchers in Chicago to evaluate each field of legal work on several different dimensions, including 
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The most ethical attorneys in this reputation-based survey practiced in the areas 
of civil rights/civil liberties, international law, intellectual property, general family 
practice/poverty law, general corporate law, estates, and securities. By contrast, the 
attorneys who ranked the lowest on ethical conduct practiced in the areas of divorce, 
plaintiff personal injury, personal bankruptcy, and criminal defense. Moreover, this 
ranking of legal specialties based on ethical conduct changed very little between 
1975 and 1995 , according. to Heinz and Laumann's identical survey, conducted 
twenty years earlier.21 
This ranking, however, is based solely on reputation as judged by outside academ­
ics, so it does not provide direct evidence of ethical behavior. Nevertheless, its results 
can be compared with a ranking derived from a survey of law graduates from the 
University of Michigan law school based on their observation and knowledge of fel­
low practitioners in each legal area.22 The Michigan survey also shows a hierarchical 
ranking of lawyers' ethical conduct according to different substantive legal fields. 
In annual surveys conducted between 1980 and 2006 of Michigan law graduates 
15, 25 , and 35 years out of law school, 6,108 graduates answered a question ask­
ing the extent to which they agreed with the statement, "the lawyers with whom 
I deal (other than those in my own office) are highly ethical in their conduct."23 
Substantially more lawyers practicing in the areas of energy, banking, securities, real 
property, employee benefits, and estates agreed (mildly to strongly) that their peers 
in the field were highly ethical than did lawyers practicing in the areas of labor rela­
tions, criminal law, insurance, immigration, and civil rights/discrimination (which 
ranked lowest) .24 Other areas of practice such as corporate, intellectual property, 
environmental law, and domestic relations fell in between. 
The Michigan survey data, although not without problems, provide stronger evi­
dence of variation in ethical conduct by area of law since they are based observations 
intellectual challenge, public service, freedom of action, and ethical conduct (described as "the 
reputation for ethical behavior of the lawyers doing the work"). Id. at 86. 
21 Id. at 86; cf. JoHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAuMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE BAR (1982). The correlation between the 1975 and 1995 rankings was .90 based on twenty-seven 
specialties. HEINZ ET AL., supra note 20, at 328. 
22 	 This previously unpublished analysis of the survey data from 6, I 08 Michigan law graduates was done 
by David Chambers. Survey questions and results reported here are on file with the author. It is dif­
ficult to directly compare the 1995 survey data reported by Heinz, Nelson, Sandefur, and Laumann 
with the Michigan survey since the latter examines twenty-three categories of substantive law practice 
while Heinz and his colleagues examine forty-two specialties, and some of the specialties themselves 
were defined differently. 
23 Id. 
24 	 Overall, 59% of the Michigan lawyers surveyed agreed that their peers in the field where they spent 
the most time working were highly ethical, whereas 66% or more of lawyers practicing in the areas of 
energy, banking, securities, real property, employee benefits, and estates agreed with this statement, 
compared to 52% or fewer of the lawyers in the areas oflabor relations, criminal law, insurance, immi­
gration, and civil rights/discrimination. 
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by lawyers practicing in each area.25 What might explain this hierarchy? Why should 
the area of law practice make such a difference? If individual characteristics (char­
acter, substance abuse, or family stress) are key to professional misconduct, then 
shouldn't the bad apples be spread more randomly across the legal profession? The 
alternative perspective that I propose here shifts the focus from the individual lawyer 
who misbehaves to the structure, organization, and content of legal work itself. That 
is, instead of taking a microview that looks at bad apples, we should take a mac­
roview and look at "bad barrels"- conditions that foster attorney misconduct.Z6 
I suggest in this chapter that we explore the work conditions, interactions, and 
values of lawyers in different communities of practice and situate lawyer deviance 
in each particular work context. Legal specialization, along with the stratification of 
the profession, impacts lawyers' understandings of what constitutes professional con­
duct and misconduct. That is to say, defining unprofessional conduct first requires 
a definition of professional conduct, and that depends on the context of lawyers' 
work. A conception of lawyer deviance that defines professionalism according to 
legal context, integrates two bodies of literature. On the one hand are the critics of 
the official ideology of the profession, an ideology that assumes universal ethics for 
all lawyers, influencing their conduct from the top down. In David Wilkins' classic 
critique, "we must abandon the traditional model's commitment to general, uni­
versally applicable ethical rules" in favor of midlevel principles for the regulation 
of lawyers .27 Similarly, Judge Stanley Sporkin drew on his experience in securities 
law to call for separate codes of professional conduct for the various specialties, 
which would acknowledge the facts, problems, and responsibilities unique to each 
of them.28 Robert Nelson and David Trubek argued, "there are multiple and com­
peting visions of what it means to be a 'professional"'29 and proposed instead that 
we examine different "arenas of professionalism," that is, "particular institutional 
25 	 Lawyers may not share a common standard for "highly ethical conduct" that is independent of the 
area in which they practice. Also, the most ethical fields tend to involve counseling and transac­
tional work, whereas the least ethical fields involve adversarial negotiations or litigation. The former 
is less likely to be observed by professional peers than the latter. And it may simply be less possible to 
perceive highly ethical conduct in adversarial legal settings. Finally, these data come from graduates 
of only one elite law school. 
26 	 Blake E. Ashforth, Dennis A Gioia, Sandra L. Robinson & Linda K Trevino, Introduction to Special 
Topic Forum: Re-Viewing Organizational Corruption, 33 AcADEMY OF MGMT. REv. 670, 673 (2008); 
see also Levin supra note 20. 
27 Wilkins, supra note 8, at 5 1  5 .  
28 Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 
CEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149 ( 1993). 
29 Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers 
in Context, in LAWYERS' lDEALSfLAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROFESSION 177, 182 (Robert L. Nelson, David M. Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1 992). 
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settings in which groups construct, explicitly or implicitly, models of the law and of 
lawyering.''30 
There is also a growing empirical literature describing the shared expectations and 
professional values of particular legal cultures and subcultures: divorce attorneys,31 
plaintiff personal injury networks,32 criminal court workgroups,33 solo and small firm 
attorneys,34 legal services organizations,35 prosecutors and government lawyers,36 
corporate litigators,37 bankruptcy lawyers,38 and even different law firms and the 
practice groups within them.39 These distinct "communities of practice," as my col­
leagues and I have suggested, consist of "groups of lawyers with whom practitioners 
interact and to whom they compare themselves and look for common expectations 
and standards."40 Such communities are multiple and overlapping. Experienced 
attorneys learn to navigate among them as they represent different types of clients 
or find themselves working in different practice areas or institutional contexts. It is 
within these diverse communities that we can identify "varieties of professionalism 
in practice."41 This bottom-up perspective on legal professionalism reveals lawyers' 
30 	 Id. at 1 79. 
31 	 See, e.g., -LYNN MATHER, CRAIG A. McEwEN & RICHARD J. MAIMAN, DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WoRK: 
VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE (2001); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, 
DIVORCE LAWYERS AND ThEIR CLIENTS: POWE R AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS ( 1995). 
32 	 See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CoNTINGENCY FEE LEGAL 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004 ); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, 
It Was the Worst of Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs Practice in Texas, 80 Thx. L. REv. 1781 
(2004); Sara Parikh, Professionalism and Its Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the Plaintiffs 
Personal Injury Bar (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago). 
33 	 See, e.g., }AMES EISENSTEIN, RoY B. FLEMMING & PETER F. NARDULLI, ThE CoNTOURS OF 
JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS ( 1988); }AMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT jACOB, FELONY 
JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL CoURTS (1977); LYNN MATHER, PLEA 
BARGAINING OR ThiAL? THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL CASE DISPOSITION ( 1979). 
34 See, e.g., CARROLL SERON, THE BusiNESS OF PRACTICING LAw: ThE WoRK LIVES OF SoLo AND SMALL 
FIRM ATTORNEYS ( 1996); Levin, supra note 9. 
35 Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical 
Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 1  0 1  (1996). 
36 	 MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: ThE ExPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JuDGES, AND 
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); PATRICK SCHMIDT, LAWYERS AND REGULATION: THE POLITICS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (2005). 
37 	 DuFFY GRAHAM, ThE CoNSCIOUSNESS OF THE LITIGATOR (2005); Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in 
Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35  U. MEM. L. REv. 631  (2005); Mark C. Suchman, 
Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 
837 (1998). 
38 	 MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT You KrLL: ThE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER (2004). 
39 	 MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS ( 1  994); MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS REVISITED: 
TRANSFORMATIONS AND RESILIENCE IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE (2007); EMMANUEL 
LAzEGA, ThE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: ThE SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION AMONG PEERS 
IN A CORPORATE LAw PARTNERSHIP (2001). 
-10 	 MATHER ET AL., supra note 3 1 ,  at 6. 
9: 	 Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
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shared expectations and norms in particularized practice settings, expectations that 
are socially constructed by attorneys working with specific clients, knowledge, legal 
rules, social networks, institutions, and workplace organizations. 
Within these communities, lawyer behavior is constrained by the norms and prac­
tices of colleagues. This "collegial control" over work involves multiple dimensions: 
It includes shared languages, knowledge, and identities that together reinforce com­
mon understandings of the challenges of particular kinds of legal work. It involves 
internalized nonns of conduct learned in life, in law school, and during socializa­
tion into practice. It includes pressures from peers to behave in particular ways in 
order to function effectively in a system of reciprocal relationships. It involves for­
mal nonns of conduct and the threat of sanction for violating these norms. Collective 
organization and identity strengthen collegial control over work.42 
These mechanisms of collegial control emerged from research on communities of 
practice among divorce attorneys in New England. Other aspects of control within 
communities of practice include the need to maintain a good reputation to attract 
clients- for example, in personal injury practice43- and lawyers' advice networks­
groups of lawyers who provide information and judgment to attorneys early in their 
careers and help shape expectations for solo and small-firm lawyers .44 
Large law firms also have embedded controls built into the way they are organized 
and operate. Ethical consciousness among corporate litigators in large law firms, 
according to Kimberly Kirkland, is constructed through an organizational logic that 
depends on situational factors, following the "choice of norm" rule: In light of the 
varying informal expectations in a large firm, a lawyer learns to follow the guide­
lines of the partner or group for which she is working, and the best associates not 
only identify the appropriate norms but can navigate easily among them.45 Mark 
Suchman found corporate litigators to have rather weak material controls within the 
firm, and somewhat stronger controls through culture - particularly, the selection, 
socialization, and interaction of associates and partners. But he notes that even these 
internal collegial controls, which used to sustain the firm as a community, have 
weakened as large firm practice has become more market driven.46 
Although collegial control may be the most effective means of regulating lawyers, 
it is vulnerable on numerous counts. Lawyers not embedded in their firm or practice 
specialty may choose to defect from the norms of the community, or lawyers who 
42 	 Id. at 178 (emphasis added). 
43 	 See KRITZER, supra note 32. For discussion of reputation as a constraint on attorney escalation of 
conflict, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and 
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 509 ( 1994 ). 
44 Levin, supra note 9, at 328-32. 
45 Kirkland, supra note 37. 
46 Suchman, supra note 37. 
l 
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are unfamiliar with an area may be ignorant of the particular practices that guide 
successful specialists there. The next section explores two t)lpes of formal regulation 
of attorney conduct with an eye to what they might show about variation in miscon­
duct across different areas of practice. 
FORMAL SANCTIONS AND AREAS OF PRACTICE 
Bar Discipline 
Most states do not publish summary data about the characteristics of attorneys 
facing grievances. But data that are available show the top three practice areas for 
complaints about attorney misconduct to be in family law, criminal law, and per­
sonal injury, followed by real estate and probate, with the precise ranking of areas 
varying by state and method of counting_47 Investigations against attorneys in Illinois 
in 2004, for example, were most frequent in matters of criminal law, domestic rela­
tions, tort, and real estate, in that order; only 6 percent of investigations ended with 
formal charges filed for attorney misconduct.48 Such extensive screening is typical 
for attorney grievances. According to an analysis of state data submitted to the ABA 
(or 2006, the average state agency investigates only 58 percent of the grievances it 
receives, only a fraction of those result in charges, and only 7.8 percent of investiga­
tions yield public discipline.49 Some grievances are referred to other agencies such 
as fee arbitration or consumer protection, whereas others are dismissed or resolved 
informally without investigation. 
Although criminal law and domestic relations usually top the charts for griev­
ances or investigations, those areas typically drop in the rankings when it comes to 
disciplinary charges filed against lawyers. In Illinois in 2004, for example, although 
the ranking of investigations (in declining order of frequency) were (l) domestic 
relations, (2) criminal, (3) tort, and (4) real estate, the last two areas (tort and real 
estate) emerged as numbers one and two for charges filed. Similarly, reports from " 
Maine and New Hampshire showed attorneys in criminal law and family law to 
have the highest proportion of docketed complaints against them (close to half of 
' 
47 	 See Craig McEwen & Lynn Mather, Client Grievances and Client Relationships: Central Challenges 
of Divorce Practice, Paper Presented at Conference on Lawyers in Practice: Ethical Decision Making 
in Context (April 23, 2010) (noting that a search of websites for twenty states' grievance offices 
showed that most did not publish summary statistics on the nature of complaints, charges, and final 
sanctions). 
48 	 See Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois, ARDC 
Organizational Information, http://www. iardc.org/orginfo.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010). 
49 	 Analysis of the ABA data was done by HALT, a legal reform group. See HALT, Attorney Discipline 
Report Card 2006, http://www.halt.org/reform_projects!lawyer_accountability/report_card__2006/ 
index_Z.php (last visited Feb. 20, 201 0). 
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all complaints came from just these two areas), but proportionately fewer family law 
and criminal attorneys were found guilty of misconduct. 5° 
Professional discipline involves "both deviant behavior and agency response," as 
Bruce Arnold and John Hagan conclude after comparing Canadian lawyers prose­
cuted for misconduct with an equal number of lawyers who received complaints but 
were not prosecuted. 51 Just as any understanding of crime rates rests on the nature of 
both defendant and police/prosecutorial behavior, the same holds true for explain­
ing lawyer deviance. Arnold and Hagan found certain characteristics of attorneys 
(for instance, solo practice and inexperience) make them particularly vulnerable 
targets for complaints but that discipline agencies were also more likely to prosecute 
certain kim!s of offenses - such as those involving financial harm to client or viola­
tion of trust accounts. 52 Similar to Canada, reports of discipline in the United States 
suggest a high likelihood of sanction for attorneys who have committed more seri­
ous professional violations, especially involving the abuse of financial trusts . 53 Other 
frequently sanctioned misconduct includes neglect, failure to communicate, and 
fraud. 54 Who gets disciplined depends in part, on "which misconduct the disciplin­
ary agencies see fit to investigate" and on "whether the disciplinary agency has the 
resources to investigate misconduct where the perpetrator is a large firm lawyer."55 
What characterizes family law, criminal law, and personal injury such that attor­
neys handling these cases are more vulnerable to bar grievances? Since it is clients 
who most frequently initiate complaints (as opposed to other lawyers or judges), 
and these are personal plight areas of law, it is easy to see why individuals with 
few other outlets for complaints might turn to discipline agencies. Divorce, crim­
inal, and personal injury cases involve emotional turmoil, high stress, pain, and 
suffering. Consequently, some client complaints against attorneys might simply be 
venting, scapegoating their lawyers for the fact that life has not gone as planned. 
Also, attorneys engaged in these areas of practice enjoy great autonomy due to the 
imbalance of information between the one-shot client and the experienced lawyer. 
Moreover, these attorneys usually work in sole practice or small firms where there 
is little or no oversight and little support staff. And in some of these areas (such as 
50 	 Maine Board of Overseers of the Bar, 2007 Annual Report; New Hampshire Supreme Court, Attorney 
Discipline System, 2008 Annual Report. The 2008 New Hampshire report does not show the area of 
law for sanctioned attorneys but this pattern is shown in an earlier analysis by New Hampshire bar 
counsel. See Thomas V. Trevethick, Is There a Pattern in the Madness? A Statistical Survey of Conduct 
Complaints, 36 N.H. B.J. 1 3  ( 1  995). 
51 	 Bruce L. Arnold & John Hagan, Careers of Misconduct: The Structure of Prosecuted Professional 
Deviance Among Lawyers, 57 AM. Soc. REv. 77 1, 779 ( 1992). 
52 Id. at 777. 
51 See, e.g., New Hampshire and Maine reports, supra note 50. 
54 Id. 
55 Lerman, supra note 9, at 913 .  
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criminal defense or divorce practice with a working-class clientele), there are class 
differences between lawyer and client that accentuate the power of the attorney. 
Thus, there are few obvious controls over attorney conduct in these personal plight 
areas, at least by comparison with lawyers in large law firms who work in bureau­
cratic structures surrounded by peers and staff, with sophisticated clients (general 
counsel or the financial officer for a corporation). 
Nevertheless, we know from research on the different communities of practice 
in the divorce, criminal defense, and personal injury areas that informal collegial 
controls do exist and influence attorney conduct. Shared identities and knowledge, 
repeated interactions in social networks, informal norms, and the need to maintain 
a quality reputation in order to attract clients all contribute to lawyer professionalism 
in these particular areas of practice. Moreover, specialists in these fields know the 
risks of client complaints and incorporate defensive strategies in their practices 
where they can. Attorney deviance, in the macroview that I suggest here, could be 
explained in two ways: by attorney participation in subcultures of specialists with 
deviant norms, or by the activities of general practitioners without experience or 
knowledge in the specific area of law. 
On the one hand are the subcultures of law practice that maintain and transmit 
norms that "in some cases, directly contribute to deviant behavior."56 Several of the 
cases of lawyer deviance described by Abel involved specialists who had learned 
sloppy or shady behavior from other lawyers. Leslie Levin, for example, discusses the 
impact on the lawyers in Abel's book of particular community norms in real estate 
(a "pressurized place" with little help for a new lawyer), immigration (high-volume 
practice with clients from "travel agents"), and personal injury (with kickbacks to 
expedite settlements) .57 In each case, lawyers had observed practice norms from 
other attorneys with similar clients and work situations in these subcultures. Among 
divorce lawyers, for example, are a few specialists who handle an extremely high 
volume of cases for low fees and who struggle to provide competent representation 
to all their clients. 58 Other specialists in divorce include the small subgroup of attor­
neys who acknowledged being "unreasonable," more litigious, and more likely to 
do whatever their client wanted. 59 Given that some divorce clients seek vengeance 
and may want to use the legal process to punish their spouse - by hiding assets or 
making false charges - divorce lawyers who follow a client's wishes without question 
may find end up facing grievances from opposing counsel or the court. Lawyers in 
all of these examples specialize in the particular area of law but share a professional 
56 Levin, supra note 3, at 29. 

57 Levin, supra note 1 9, at 1 5  58-59. 

58 MATHER ET AL., supra note 3 1 ,  at 25-30. 

59 Id. at 5 1, 127-30. 
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ideology and type of practice, similar clients, and working conditions. That is, they 
develop their own community of practice, a subculture within the larger community 
of specialists, which embraces norms more likely to lead to professional deviance. 
Nonspecialist practitioners constitute a second group of lawyers who, I suspect, 
are also especially vulnerable to grievances in fields such as divorce, criminal 
defense, personal injury, or real estate. The general practitioner who specializes in 
"doorway law" - taking whichever client walks through the doorway- is taking a 
professional risk. As one New York attorney explained, attorneys in general practice 
often engage in "naked malpractice" since "most people don't know what they don't 
know."60 Recent studies of small firm and solo practitioners have all found increased 
specialization among them, as a strategy for getting clients, a way to achieve compe­
tence, and a means to maintain a professional reputation. "The days of the solo or 
small-firm 'general law practice' appear to be over (or at least numbered)."61 
Like general practice lawyers, specialists might be at greater risk if they take on 
clients outside of their specialty, such as the real estate lawyer who accepts a divorce 
client or a personal injury specialist who accepts a criminal case. Why would they 
do this? For the money - to pay the bills and generate some income for a business 
that is struggling. 62 Or as a favor - to provide full service perhaps to a family friend, 
business acquaintance, or previous client. Data on lawyers working outside of their 
normal specialty is difficult to obtain, let alone data to confirm my hunch that these 
lawyers receive a higher proportion of grievances. In research my colleagues and I 
conducted on divorce, we found that a surprisingly large proportion of divorce clients 
are represented by nonspecialists. Analysis of the dockets of over 4,000 divorce cases 
revealed that most lawyer names (66 percent in New Hampshire and 55 percent in 
Maine) appeared in only one or two divorce cases over a four-year period.63 Such 
lawyers who represent only an occasional divorce client might consult with peers 
in the community for advice and information. But they also might decide to sim­
ply handle the case on their own and assume they can learn all they need to know, 
60 Levin, supra note 3, at 7. 
61 Karen L. Pascale, Small Wonders: Lessons from Delaware's Small Firms and Solo Practitioners, 19  
DEL. LAw. 17 ,  17 (2001); see also SERON, supra note 34; Levin, supra note 9 .  
6 2  	I recognize that an individual focus on deviance here could help explain why certain practitioners 
would choose to practice outside of their area of competence, just as a microlevel perspective could 
help answer why certain subcultures develop their own deviant norms. My point, '!l'hich I return to 
in the conclusion, is that both perspectives are needed to understand attorney deviance and that the 
current focus rests too much blame on the individual practitioner, ignoring the complicity oflaw firms 
and the legal system itself. 
63 	 By contrast, a relatively small group of lawyers handled the majority of divorce representations. The 
20% of the lawyers who were listed most frequently appeared in 56% of the New Hampshire cases 
and 65% of the Maine cases. MATHER ET AL., supra note 3 1 ,  at 47-48. Note that, because we sampled 
counties in the two states, some of the lawyers with few cases may have been listed more often in a 
neighboring county or state. 
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taking a risk that they have the competence to identify and respond to the particular 
challenges of a divorce case. 
Legal Malpractice 
Professional liability provides another set of formal controls over lawyers, along with 
the discipline of state agencies. And here too, certain fields of law appear to top the 
list in generating complaints. In 1985 , the ABA Standing Committee on Lawyers' 
Professional Liability began to collect and publish statistics on claims against attor­
neys for malpractice, using data supplied by national insurance companies. In its 
latest study (2007), the ABA has data from more than twenty-five insurance com­
panies, but because some companies do not participate (e.g., Attorneys' Liability 
Assurance Society), mid- and large-size law firms are underrepresented in their 
analysis.64 Nevertheless, as in lawyer discipline, claims against attorneys for legal 
malpractice show a "remarkable consistency" over time by the area of law. 
Plaintiff personal injury and real estate ranked first and second in the distribu­
tion of claims (with family law often third) in every ABA survey between 1985 and 
2007.65 Indeed these three legal areas supplied over one-half of the 40,486 claims 
against attorneys in 2007.66 Some cautions about these data are in order, beside the 
fact that they overrepresent solo and small-firm attorneys. Since the data are based 
on insurance claims, it is obvious that attorneys without insurance are not included, 
nor a're many large-firm lawyers who are insured through ALAS. As noted earlier, 
the likelihood of attorneys having malpractice insurance varies significantly by state 
and firm size. Moreover, proof of legal malpractice requires a finding that "but for" 
the negligence of the lawyer, the client would have won his case. Such a standard 
is especially difficult in a criminal case, in which criminal defendants must essen­
tially prove their innocence if they are to succeed in a malpractice claim against an 
attorney. Indeed, very few malpractice claims are filed in criminal matters (5% in 
2007). Finally, the likelihood of a malpractice claim also depends on the extent of 
the damages and on the ease of translating damages into monetary terms. 
In their analysis of the claim data by field oflaw, the ABA cautions that additional 
information is necessary before concluding that certain areas are riskier than others. 
We lack the data, the report explains, to conclude that the high percentage of claims 
in personal injury cases "is disproportionate to the overall time spent in this area of 
legal practice."67 But a comparison of malpractice claims in Florida with data on the 
Florida bar (using Martindale-Hubbell and membership in specialty bar sections) 
64 	 AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROF. LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS: 2004-2007 2, 17 (2008).
61 I d. at 4. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 3. 
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done by Manuel Ramos in 1995 suggests that claims do not occur disproportionately 
in particular areas of law, such as personal injury and real estate.68 On the other 
hand, a study of liability claims at firms of thirty-five or more attorneys found that "a 
firm's type of practice, geographic region, and size were significantly related to both 
the total number and aggregate dollar amount of claims resolved from 1992-1996," 
with corporate practice having the greatest exposure.69 
Whether or not claims data demonstrate disproportionate risk for certain practice 
areas, it is clearly the case that insurance companies believe in variation by legal 
fields and they set their premiums accordingly. For example, one application form 
for lawyers' professional liability insurance, which runs more than ten pages plus 
supplements, asks first about total billings and size of firm.70 The very next set of 
questions probes a lawyer's area of practice in great detail. ThȀre is a matrix listing 
eighteen areas of law in one column - banking, general corporate, tax, employ­
ment, copyright/patent, domestic relations, oil and gas, among others - and next 
to each area is space to indicate the percentage of total gross billings derived from 
that area of practice for two separate years. Further information on the nature of 
clients (plaintiff versus defense, creditor or debtor, management versus union) is 
requested for each area of law that represents more than 10 percent of the applicant's 
practice. According to the executive vice-president of a large Connecticut insur­
ance company, "area of practice plays a large role in the underwriting and pricing 
of legal malpractice risks, as do other factors such as geography and firm size."71 
And an attorney with over twenty years experience in insurance law said, "I learned 
quickly that there are five areas of law you don't touch unless you do it all the time. 
You need to specialize or else you can get yourself in Big Trouble." When asked to 
name those five areas, he responded, "tax, patents, domestic relations, ERISA, and 
corporate real estat'e."72 
DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES IN DIVORCE 

AND CORPORATE PRACTICE 

How does the interaction of collegial control with the formal structures of lawyer 
discipline and professional liability work? This section presents two examples of 
68 Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: No Lawyer or Client Is Safe, 47 FLA. L. REv. I, 52 (1995). 
69 Harris Study Con/inns Value of Risk Management for Law Finns, http://wwwZ.prnewswire.com/ 
cgi-bin/stories. pi? ACCT = 1 04&STORY =/www/story/9-1 1-97 / 3 1 5  2 50&EDATE (last visted Sept. 8, 
2009) (emphasis added). 
70 See Application for Lawyers Professional Liability Insurance for Lloyd's Insurance (December 2, 
2001) (on file with author). 
71 E-mail from Executive Vice-President of large Connecticut insurance firm that handles professional 
liability policies (Sept. 9, 2009) (on file with author). 
72 Confidential Interview with Maryland lawyer (Jan. 7, 2009) (on file with author). 
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informal practices described by divorce attorneys and by lawyers in corporate law 
work: Choose Your Client Carefully and Cover Your Ass (CYA). Both of these strate­
gies address ethical challenges, as attorneys see them, and help constitute profession­
alism in practice. That is to say, these are everyday practices used by experienced, 
specialized lawyers in response to what they perceive can get them into trouble. 
Choose Your Client Carefully 
The importance of client selection typically ranks high on any listing of advice for 
lawyers, whether in solo or small-firm practice or in large firms. "Pick the right 
clients,"73 cautions Pascale, and avoid "the 'bad' client,"74 writes Levin, since it is 
clients who often puȁh attorneys to engage in unethical conduct or have unreason­
able expectations. Divorce clients "often sought to underreport their income on 
financial disclosure statements," according to lawyers interviewed in New York.75 In 
interviews with divorce lawyers in New England, my colleagues and I asked whether 
they screened clients, and more than 90 percent said they did.76 Some attorneys 
said that they used their initial interview as an opportunity both to hear the client's 
expectations and to explain their style of divorce representation. "They decide if 
they can work with me and I decide ifl can work with them," as one lawyer said.77 
Other lawyers mentioned using their secretaries to report rude or obnoxious behav­
ior from clients as they sat in the waiting room or complained about having to 
wait for an appointment. The most common adjective attorneys used to describe a 
client who might be rejected was "difficult." One type of "difficult" client was the 
vengeful, unrealistic, or stubborn spouse who was "totally out for blood." Because 
most divorce lawyers prided themselves on being "reasonable," they were wary of 
potential clients who were not. "Difficult" clients also included those who would be 
especially demanding of the attorney's time: 
[p]eople . . .  who look like they are going to think they are my only clients . . . .  
(s]omeone who is going to want to be able to pick up the phone and call you four, 
five, six times a week and want you there to hold their hand and to talk with them 
about everything.78 
A "red flag" signaling a difficult divorce client was the person who had a prior divorce 
attorney. The fact that the client was unhappy with one lawyer suggested that she 
7l Pascale, supra note 61 ,  at 1 8. 

74 Levin, supra note 9, at 33 8. 

75 Id. at 3 38. 

76 MATHE R ET AL., supra note 3 1 ,  at 2 1 3  n. l2. 

77 This quote and the material following comes from MATHE R ET AL., supra note 3 1 ,  at 93-95. I also draw 

directly from our lawyer interviews. For details on data and methods of this study, see id. at 195-201.  
78  Id. at 94. 
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might also be dissatisfied with the next one. As one lawyer explained her screening 
process: 
I do not represent people who have previously had another attorney and want to get 
rid of that attorney. Under no circumstances. Because the reason they are leaving 
is probably because they don't like what they are being told. And if I have general 
respect for that attorney, I will not get myself involved in someone else's garbage. 79 • 
Another attorney said, "If you've got somebody coming in from another office, then 
you instinctively smell trouble . . . .  If they have been a pain in the rump to another 
lawyer, then they are going to be a pain in the rump to you."80 
What is interesting about these comments is not whether divorce lawyers actually 
turn away "difficult" or "recycled" clients - obviously many do not - but instead, 
what they reveal about how lawyers think about choosing clients. Experienced 
divorce attorneys have learned that overly demanding clients - especially those who 
lack the funds to properly compensate the attorney - can be a risk to represent. Who 
wants to return phone calls from someone who is unrelenting in their demands, 
their anger, or their grief? Such difficult clients are precisely the ones who might 
file a grievance with the bar for an attorney's lack of communication. Moreover, the 
social network of other divorce lawyers provides a warning sign to alert lawyers to 
clients who might pose problems for them. Interestingly, this informal knowledge 
among divorce lawyers echoes advice on how to prevent malpractice claims: 
Many malpractice claims can be avoided by identifying and refusing to work with 
problem clients. Experienced practitioners recognize the following characteristics 
as "red flags": 
• The client is changing attorneys in the middle of a case; 
• The case already has been rejected by one or more firms; 

• 
 The client wants to proceed with the case out of principle, regardless of cost . . . .81 
Although most divorce lawyers self-identified (and were named by their peers) 
as "reasonable" lawyers who shared the same generally cooperative approach in 
divorce negotiation and tried to avoid scorched-earth tactics, some attorneys special­
ized in a more adversarial or litigious style. Clients who left their first divorce lawyer 
were more likely to seek out and ultimately retain an attorney with a more litigious 
approach.82 
79 Confidential Interview (on file with author). 
80 Id. at 94-9 5 .  
8 1  Stephen M. Blumberg, Risk Management: Preventing Malpractice Claims, 1 3  LEGAL EcoN. 52, 52 
( 1  987) (emphasis added). 
82 In divorce cases where both parties are represented (which was less than half the cases), about 10% 
of the parties had more than one attorney listed as attorney of record in the case docket. Analysis of 
the docketed cases for the lawyers we interviewed showed that lawyers who were most likely to be the 
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The economics of divorce practice led some lawyers to take whatever clients they 
could get, regardless of how difficult these clients might be. Attorneys with high­
volume, low-fee divorce practices could not afford to be selective. These lawyers 
were especially at risk for misconduct, especially neglect, because of taking on more 
cases than they could handle. One lawyer admitted sheepishly that his caseload was 
too high: 
Well, I think it would be pealthier for me and for the clients if I decreased it some, 
maybe charged a little more, or something. And wasn't quite so on the edge here as 
far as getting things done. Risking doing sloppy work. . . .  I mean, I've got some cases 
that are seriously neglected here. And I keep promising people I'll get to it.83 
Other attorneys, perhaps just starting out in practice or coming from a different 
legal specialty (for example, to handle a divorce for a friend or colleague), lacked 
the knowledge to read the cues about problem clients in divorce and might not have 
realized the difficulties that some clients could bring. In sum, experienced divorce 
attorneys learned that one way to avoid complaints about misconduct was to be 
selective in accepting clients, but not all practices allowed lawyers that strategy. 
Corporate attorneys also learn the importance of choosing clients carefully. In 
large law firms, avoidance of conflict of interest is key in taking on a new client. 
Office organizational policies institutionalize such screening, for instance, by saying 
"you cannot get a billing number until you get a conflicts clearance."84 Screening 
clients helps lawyers avoid bar grievances and protects against complaints of mal­
practice. According to the ABA's Risk Management: Survival Tools for Law Firms, 
The best time for lawyers and firms to protect themselves is when a client first seeks 
to engage them . . . .  Many sources of potential risk posed by clients . . .  can be readily 
identified at or before the time of engagement.85 
The authors of this ABA guide draw on the Kaye Scholer malpractice case to empha­
size such issues as the competence of the firm to handle the case and the scope 
of sȂrvices to be provided. Kaye Scholer was sued by (and ultimately settled with) 
the federal Office of Thrift Supervision for the law firm's role in keeping Lincoln 
Savings & Loan afloat even when the bank was no longer solvent. Had the law 
firm focused on banking regulation and defined the scope of their representation 
accordingly, they might have acted differently and thus avoided liability. 86 Similarly, 
second lawyers scored significantly higher on seeing litigation as an important skill in divorce practice 
than did lawyers who were first lawyers. MATHER ET AL., supra note 3 1 ,  at 85. 
83 I d. at 26 
84 Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law 
Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HoFSTRA L. REv. 691, 692 (2002). 
85 ANTHONY E. DAVIS & PETER R. ]ARVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SuRVIVAL TooLs FOR LAw FIRMS 5 (2d ed. 
2007).
86 Id. at 4-6 
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a popular legal ethics text cites client selection as one of two practices that carry a 
high risk of triggering professional liability: "accept any client and any matter that 
comes along.''87 The Harris survey of large law firms (discussed earlier) provides 
empirical support for such advice. The survey found that one of the two most effec­
tive risk management practices to reduce claims costs in large firms involved client 
screening. Specifically, "firms that have a separate partner or committee to oversee 
the acceptance of new clients and engagements, on average, paid out approximately 
$800,000 less for their largest claim."88 
Attention to client selection helps lawyers maintain professional standards and 
avoid complaints against them by rejecting problem clients and seeking to estab­
lish an appropriate match between lawyer and client before representation begins. 
Once engaged by a client, how do lawyers address potentially problematic situations 
or gray areas of conduct? Many examples abound. Defensive strategies described 
by attorneys as CYA in divorce law practice and in corporate litigation show that 
the same label refers to very different conduct in these two communities of prac­
tice. Examination of these strategies sheds light on the values and institutional con­
straints lawyers face in these two areas. 
Cover Your Ass 
In any area of legal practice, there are bound to be ethical challenges that require 
discretionary judgment and where poor decisions can get an attorney in trouble. 
From experience and through their peers, lawyers learn to identify these situations 
and to protect themselves, taking precautions to "cover your ass" should a complaint 
be brought. The risk of complaint depends on the area of practice. Here, I explore 
two different domains, divorce and corporate litigation, where lawyers report system­
atic use of CYA. 
Divorce attorneys frequently face disagreement with their clients over settlement. 89 
The most common conflict arises between vengeful, unrealistic clients who insist on 
more than they are entitled to and ask their lawyer to use the legal process to strike 
back at their spouse. But the reverse occurs as well. A client, whether out of guilt, 
sorrow, or fatigue, sometimes wants to sign an agreement for much less than he or she 
is entitled to. When presented with these two hypotheticals, divorce lawyers report 
that they would try to educate and persuade clients in both situations to be reason­
able - to soften expectations in the first situation and to have more backbone in the 
second. If persuasion was not successful, lawyers faced the difficult choice of whether 
87 LERMAN & ScHRAG, supra note 5, at 1 30. The second high-risk practice that they mention, discussed 
earlier, is to "practice outside your area of expertise." 
88 Harris Study Confirms Value of Risk Management for Law Firms, supra note 69. 
89 This section draws on MATHER ET AL., supra note 3 1 ,  at 87-109. 
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to continue to represent the client. Some would continue representation in both situ­
ations. But lawyers were more than twice as likely to say they would· withdraw from 
the case when the client was making unreasonably high demands than when the 
client was selling herself short. Collegial controls in the form of peer pressure from 
other lawyers, lawyers' interest in maintaining a reputation for reasonableness, and 
judicial disapproval steered many lawyers away from making excessive demands for 
clients in court. The reverse situation, however, led to a different response. · 
If, after an attorney's best efforts at persuasion, clients were adamant about selling 
themselves short to obtain the divorce, lawyers typically said they would continue 
to represent the client, with some explicitly invoking the ethical rule in favor of 
client self-determination. Most lawyers added that they would also write a CYA letter 
explaining that the client was accepting the divorce agreement against the lawyer's 
advice. As one divorce attorney put it: 
If the client insists on going through with it, then what I would generally do is write 
a long lettǽr that I will require them to sign before I'll continue representation. That 
serves a couple of purposes. When they see it in writing and show it to some friends, 
by and large, they will change their mind and decide not to go through with it. But 
in the event that they do go through with it, I won't be sued for malpractice.90 
Although 60 percent of lawyers interviewed said they would write CYA letters when 
faced with these situations, analysis of lawyers' responses showed that those most spe­
cialized in family law were most likely to write them. Family law specialists (devoting 
75% or more of their practice to family law) were twice as likely as nonspecialists 
(devoting less than 25% of their practice to family law) to refer to CYA letters when 
the client wanted less than the lawyer recommended. Lawyers embedded in the 
network of family law specialists undoubtedly shared horror stories of grievances and 
malpractice complaints from clients who later complained about getting an unfair 
divorce settlement. These lawyers knew the value of CYA, in contrast to attorneys 
lacl�ing experience in divorce who thought they could protect themse.Jves simply by 
saying it was the client's choice to settle. 
Corporate litigators also report disagreement with their clients; portraying them 
as "amoral, short-sighted and excessively aggressive.''91 In private conversations with 
one another, litigators share what Duffy Graham calls the "two rules of practice. 
The first rule is The Client is the Enemy. The second rule is Don't Forget the 
First Rule ."92 Overt tensions between lawyer and client do not arise because of fear 
of malpractice, according to Graham. Instead, Kirkland explains, litigators shape 
their conduct according to the expectations of different audiences (clients, partners, 
90 Id. at 105. 

91 Suchman, supra note 37, at 848. 

92 GRAHAM, supra note 37, at 55 .  
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judges, the media) constituted by what the situation demands.93 How do litigators 
respond to clients who expect overly aggressive discovery and no-holds-barred liti­
gation? Suchman found one group of litigators among his informants deferred to 
their clients, adopting an agency or hired-gun approach, and another group saw 
themselves as fiduciaries who "would make at least a cursory effort at moral suasion 
if they felt their client was in the wrong." Some litigators in the second group added, 
"that a 'CYA [cover-your-ass ] letter' might suffice to discharge the attorney's advisory 
obligations."94 Given the relative power of clients over litigators and the relative 
weakness of judges in sanctioning attorneys, litigators see their biggest risk as not 
sufficiently deferring to their clients. 
In-house counsel, speaking on behalf of the corporate clients they work for, not 
surprisingly see any efforts of outside litigators to exercise independent decision mak­
ing in counseling to be "at best redundant with the in-house counsel's own moral 
stewardship - and, at worst, subversive of the very principle of client control . . .  
either an unethical waste of resources or an unethical attempt at manipulation.''95 
Litigators must walk a fine line between excessive aggressiveness and excessive cau­
tion. But the informal norms of their practice see zealous advocacy as a litigator's 
central responsibility and allow it to trump other ethical rules. The organizational 
logic of large law firms reinforces unquestioning client loyalty, as Kirkland writes, 
Junior lawyers are agents for the lawyers who supervise them . . .  not autonomous 
counselors who consult internal or fixed standards . . .  and advise their superiors 
about the appropriate course of action. Large-firm litigators approach their rela­
tionships with, and obligations to, their clients the same way. They must under­
stand their client's will and they have an affirmative moral obligation to zealously 
advance that will.96 
Litigators can express any moral qualms in a CYA letter but they know that they must 
act in accordance with their client's wishes and aggressively play the game Ǿf litiga­
tion as defined by their peers and opposing counsel. 
What do these two examples from two very different areas of practice suggest? 
First, experienced divorce lawyers and corporate litigators both recognize the risks 
posed by unquestioning acceptance of any client, and some institutionalize ways of 
screening clients to avoid problems. Second, when conflict arises between attorney 
and client over uncertain choices of judgment, many informal constraints - from 
peers, the firm, opposing counsel, the court, and the market for cFents - influence 
a lawyer's decision making. Third, the matrix of collegial control operates differently 
93 Kirkland, supra note 3 7, at 7 1 3-15 .  

94 Suchman, supra note 37, at  849. 

95 I d. at 850. 

96 Kirkland, supra note 3 7, at 7 1  9. 
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in the two areas of practice. In divorce, it reinforces the lawyer's independent judg­
ment over client demands for overly aggressive representation. But in corporate 
litigation, collegial control reinforces the lawyer as agent of the client and encour­
ages aggressive representation. Finally, a lawyer's attempt at self-protection through 
a CYA letter is aimed at avoidance of a grievance or malpractice claim in divorce, 
where such oversight is common. The CYA letter in corporate litigation is aimed 
at self-protection for an attorney in the unlikely event of investigation from a senior 
partner, outside agency, or court. In short, there is a dramatic divide between profes­
sionalism in these two communities of practice. What is considered unprofessional 
conduct in one is praised in the other. 
CONCLUSION 
Assessing how well the American legal profession regulates itself is a more compli­
cated task than first appears. Although individual stories of lawyer deviance point to 
glaring weaknesses, systematic data is difficult to obtain. Individual states control 
their own disciplinary processes and few publish aggregate data that includes details 
on characteristics of attorney, firm size, nature of grievance, area of law, and the type 
of discipline imposed, including private sanctions. Data on legal malpractice claims 
are similarly limited. Many insurance companies, especially those covering large 
law firms, 'will not share information with the ABA for its report, leading to a skewed 
picture of legal malpractice. Even with more complete and better data on discipline 
and claims, we still would lack a clear picture of attorney misconduct without know­
ing something about the complaint process. How often do clients or others come 
to perceive attorney misconduct and then decide to do something about it, and in 
which cases and practice areas does this occur? Ideally we would have a survey like 
the Civil Litigation Research Project, which traced the trajectory of citizen griev­
ances in different areas of law to discover which became lawsuits. 97 
Using the limited data available, I have outlined a picture of lawyer deviance 
that situates unprofessional conduct within the informal professional norms found 
in various communities of practice. Instead of individual explanations for deviance, 
I have suggested a focus on the social networks and collegial controls in particular 
areas. I do not believe that most lawyers who misbehave can be identified simply by 
their poor character or greed. Indeed, studies of white-collar crime dismiss those as 
"folk theqries" and instead emphasize the social context iǿ which criminal activity 
97 	 The Civil Litigation Research Project conducted a survey of households about grievances to under­
stand how disputes became civil lawsuits. See results and discussion in the Special Issue on Dispute 
Processing and Civil Litigation, 1 5  LAw & Soc'y REv. 485. In 1976, a study was published about client 
perceptions and complaints about attorney conduct. See Eric H. Steele and Raymond H. Nimmer, 
Lawyers, Clients and Professional Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 917 ( 1  976). 
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occurs and the available rationales or techniques of"neutral ization" that individuals 
use to justify their actions to themselves and others: 
What the criminology literature tells us . . .  is that it is not about character and it is 
not about values. On the contrary, it is various aspects of the situation that individu­
als find themselves in, what they think about this situation, and what they expect 
others to think about the situation, that plays the major role in determining how 
they conduct themselves.98 
By looking at particular situations of client representation in context, looking at 
what lawyers think about those situations and, most importantly, what they expect 
others to think and to do, we can better understand attorney misconduct. 
Collegial control provides cues to reinforce professionalism even if some of those 
communities of practice push the boundaries of what others would consider profes­
sional conduct. The very breadth of "legal professionalism" and its claim to univer­
sality provides lawyers working in different areas with the tools to neutralize their 
conduct. Thus, corporate litigators who push boundaries for their clients with their 
zealousness can overlook their moral qualms and point to client self-determination 
as they engage in what might be questionable conduct. Communities are fluid and 
overlapping, however, and attorneys may go back and forth among them, just as the 
dynamics of a large law firm continuously force attorneys to attend to shifting expec­
tations of those around them. 
Finally, an emphasis on professionalism in practice might help in "the rekindling 
of lawyer professionalism"99 by redirecting attention to the multiple ways that law­
yers learn and are taught to behave in their everyday practices. Informal collegial 
control selectively incorporates and reflects what lawyers think about formal disci­
pline and about what they think other lawyers think about it. 
98 	 Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological Perspective, 83 J. OF Bus. 
ETHICS 595, 610 (2008). Heath draws on criminological works such as J.W. COLEMAN, ThE CRIMINAL 
ELITE: ThE SoCIOLOGY OF WHITE CoLLAR CRIME ( 1989) and Gresham Sykes & David Matza, 
Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory ofDelinquenc:y, 22 AM. Soc. REv. 664. Abel cites this crimino­
logical literature in his opening chapter as well. ABEL, supra note 1 1  , at 28-38. 
99 	 AM. BAR Ass'N, lN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER 
PROFESSIONALISM ( 1986). 
